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President Bush cited a need to protect Iraq's national resources, enhance the economy and prevent it from becoming a haven for terrorists. He also said "Any military presence, should it be necessary, will be temporary and intended to promote security and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the delivery of humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction of
Iraq." The President's statement laid the foundation for a postwar military presence and security strategy for Iraq.
William Flavin states "Planning for termination and postwar operations should begin as early as possible. It must be an interagency, multinational, integrated effort. In planning for termination and post-conflict peace operations, the first and primary objective is to establish an achievable end state based on clear objectives". 2 Flavin further states:
The next most important element is achieving unity of effort among the diplomatic, military, economic and informational aspects of national power. National unity must be harmonized with multinational partners and the community of international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Planners must visualize the situation from the start of the war through termination and into post-conflict peace operations to ensure all of the parts are synchronized. With the concept harmonized, it is then necessary to consider resources. Conflict resolution may not be possible if adequate resources are not available.
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Overall, U.S. postwar planning didn't adhere to this process. Strategy development wasn't an integrated effort, particularly within the interagency process. Initially, the Department of State had lead responsibility for post-conflict planning and reconstruction. For about eight months, the Department of State developed a detailed plan and assembled a team to administer the reconstruction of Iraq. 4 The plan and its final report consisted of thirteen volumes on specific topics plus a one-volume summary and overview. 5 During January 2003 (less than two months from the start of the war) President Bush shifted responsibility for postwar occupation and reconstruction from the Department of State to DoD. Within DoD, retired LTG Jay M.
Garner was tasked to develop the postwar plan and the staff assigned consisted of a small number of Pentagon planners. This group excluded officials from the Department of State and even some from the Pentagon, including officers of the Joint Staff. 6 The shift in responsibility discarded months of planning work by Department of State officials and created a rift in interagency cooperation. In effect, this action deharmonized the unity of effort in the postwar planning process.
The interagency process also couldn't come to agreement about whether and how quickly
Iraq could become a full-fledged democracy. DoD civilian officials believed in a smooth and quick transition to democracy in Iraq, while the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency believed democracy would be difficult to achieve and viewed the prospects as bleak. 7 Thus, there was doubt whether the U.S. could achieve the President's end state for Iraq.
In planning for conflict termination, Central Command planners conducted war-gaming exercises and started preparing plans for postwar Iraq. However, the postwar plan didn't come Congress that the war would cost $50 to $60 billion. 16 Without a harmonious balance among these three elements wars cannot be won no matter how just the cause or how great the effort invested. 19 Lastly, errors made in assumptions and risks affected how DoD civilian officials visualized the situation from the start of the war through termination and into post-conflict peace operations. They assumed Iraqis would welcome Coalition forces as liberators and maintained an overly optimistic outlook regarding security and other issues in the aftermath of the war.
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These assumptions where dubious, given the fact that intelligence agencies warned before the war of significant hostility to an U.S.-led occupation. 21 In particular, they warned of Iraqi plans to carry on resistance efforts after the war. 22 The optimistic assumptions by DoD civilian officials undermined efforts to develop a sound postwar strategy. Hence, the U.S. was not adequately prepared to deal with the situation in postwar Iraq.
STRATEGY EXECUTION
Deficiencies in strategic planning came to light in how the postwar strategy was executed.
LTG Jay Garner's entrance into Baghdad was delayed by twelve days because there were too few soldiers to provide security and logistics. 23 Also, LTG Garner's staff was too small for the task and lacked the computer equipment and communications capability to effectively begin administrative operations. Within a month, LTG Garner was replaced by Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer. Thus, valuable time was lost in reconstituting the Iraqi police and governmental services to maintain security and order during the early stage of stability operations when Iraqis were forming their opinion on the new state of affairs.
The biggest mistake made following the war was disbanding the 400,000 man Iraqi Army. As predicted by U.S. intelligence agencies, an insurgency or guerilla war emerged in Iraq. Using Iraqi labor is not only less costly, but helps to reduce unemployment and the related criminal activity that is a source of instability.
The Iraqi Governing Council questioned the Coalition Provisional Authority in its spending decisions. The Authority awarded a $20 million contract to buy new revolvers and Kalashnikov rifles for the Iraqi police when U.S. forces confiscated tens of thousands of weapons monthly from abandoned arsenals. 44 The Iraqi Governing Council also challenged an American decision to spend $1.2 billion to train 35,000 Iraqi police officers in Jordan, when such training could be done in Iraq for a fraction of the cost. The perceived misuse of aid monies undermined use of economic power to win the peace in Iraq and created the perception that the U.S. wasn't committed to Iraq's economic progress.
The Coalition Provisional Authority also didn't give sufficient attention to stemming corruption. Contracts were awarded to sheiks to buy their loyalty or support even though other contractors submitted bids that were substantially less. 45 Thus, the contracting process wasn't fair and impartial, thereby fostering corruption. Unchecked, corruption weakens governments and deters foreign investment needed to achieve long-term economic prosperity. After being rebuffed initially, President Bush was able to secure pledges of $13 to $19 billion in aid from the international community. 49 The U.S. also was successful in negotiating with countries to forgive the debts owed to them by Iraq. However, the U.S. was unsuccessful in obtaining a United Nations Security Council resolution aimed at obtaining a wider multi-national military force and getting help in forming a new Iraqi government. Diplomatic efforts failed because the U.S. refused to cede control over Iraq's security and reconstruction to the United Nations. The U.S. also differed with the Security Council over the timetable for transferring sovereignty back to the Iraqi people (i.e. preferring to wait until a constitution is adopted and an elected Iraqi government is in place--a situation that could take years). However, on 15
November 2003, the U.S. reversed its position and announced a plan to end the occupation and return sovereignty to the Iraqi people by 1 July 2004. Recommendations Create a robust civilian rapid response capacity modeled on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that could mobilize U.S. experts from federal, state and local levels as well as from the private and non-profit centers.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
The United States government should take the lead in creating and supporting a multi-national Integrated Security Support Component (ISSC), providing units specifically organized, equipped, trained, and manned to execute post-conflict security tasks. 
Lesson Learned
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Recommendations In order to ensure a more holistic and effective response to the problems of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the United States should designate a lead agency to coordinate and execute DDR efforts.
Expand the U.S. government's legal authority and capacity to train indigenous police forces. 
Lesson Learned
OTHER LESSONS LEARNED
Within the federal government, a major weakness in the strategic planning process was the absence of checks and balances to ensure a sound postwar strategy was in place and executable. Wars involving regime change and rebuilding of a nation require a large commitment of resources. In the case of Iraq, Congress didn't require and DoD didn't present a documented postwar security strategy. Congress might have exposed the flaws in postwar planning and pressured the Bush administration to delay a decision to go to war had it scrutinized the postwar strategy and been aware of the true cost of reconstruction. In this regard, Congress should be the check and balance in the Federal government that ensures the ends, ways and means are in balance before the US gets involved in a major war.
To address this weakness, a Bill (H.R. 3221) was introduced in the House of The use of aid dollars to positively influence Iraqi leaders wasn't given sufficient attention.
Iraqi leaders had little to no say in how aid dollars were used. Instead, the Coalition should have set aside a portion of the aid dollars to be disbursed under the control of Iraqi leaders with the responsibility to provide full transparency. Under this process, the Coalition would stipulate how the aid dollars should be used and conduct follow-up reviews to verify compliance. Those leaders that spent funds on worthwhile endeavors would be rewarded with more aid and those leaders that didn't would get less. Disbursing aid dollars in this manner would develop leaders that support reconstruction goals and have the ability to influence popular support through the ability to provide basic services with aid dollars.
The last lesson learned deals with strategic aspects of informational power. During
Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath, the Bush administration made comments that were both contradictory and inflammatory, and had the effect of detracting from the achievement of strategic goals and objective. A well-planned and defined postwar strategy that addresses the strategic aspects of informational power would have helped to minimize such comments.
WORD COUNT=5482
